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“WHO SHOULD REGULATE CLASS
ACTION LAWYERS?”†
Nancy J. Moore*
In this article, Professor Nancy Moore explores ethical issues
implicated by class action litigation. She begins by pointing out that
neither the Model Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct deal specifically with the ethics of class
action lawyers. The author, who acted as Chief Reporter of the
Ethics 2000 Commission, argues that the Commission’s decision not
to draft rules directly addressing the ethics of class action litigation
was appropriate. Focusing on the problem of conflicting interests,
she argues that the confusion surrounding the ethics of class action
lawyers can be significantly reduced by recognizing, first, that the
class itself is the client and, second, that much of what are currently
described as “conflicts of interest” were never meant to be addressed
by traditional conflict-of-interest doctrine. Even if there are some
situations in which relaxation of the ethics rules may be justified in
order to accommodate class actions, these situations are better
addressed by case law interpreting Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The author argues that in addressing adequacy of
representation issues under Rule 23, courts should still take into
account many of the principles and concerns motivating Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7.
INTRODUCTION
Ethical issues arise frequently in class action litigation.1 These
issues include conflicts of interest,2 solicitation,3 application of the no-

† ©2002 Nancy J. Moore.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Chief Reporter for the ABA Commission
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 2000 Commission”).
I am grateful for the helpful comments of Susan Koniak, Charles Silver, Allan Stein, and
participants in the University of Illinois Symposium on “Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or
Professional Responsibility as Usual?” and the February 2002 Rutgers Law School-Camden Faculty
Worshop.
1. See, e.g., Brian V. Waid, Ethical Problems of the Class Action Practitioner: Continued Neglect
by the Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1047, 1047–48
(1981). See generally HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15 (3d
ed. 1992) (section entitled “Class Action Abuses and Legal Ethics”).
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contact rule,4 the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees,5 and the attorneywitness rule.6 There has been considerable difficulty applying existing
rules of conduct to these situations, partly because of confusion
regarding the relationship among class counsel, the named class
representatives and absent members of the class.7 Thus, it is often said
that “the ethics rules cannot be mechanically applied to class actions.”8
As for conflicting interests—perhaps the most pressing problem facing
class action lawyers—some courts go even further to state that a strict
reading of the conflict-of-interest rules in class actions should be
tempered, because the very nature of a class action is to combine many
divergent interests.9
Despite the frequency with which the propriety of lawyers’ conduct
is litigated in class action lawsuits, neither the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility10 (Model Code) nor the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct11 (Model Rules) specifically addresses the ethics of

2. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, §§ 15.24–15.25 (simultaneous or subsequent
representation of adverse clients, opt-outs, and class members); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1159 (1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); Waid,
supra note 1, at 1061–74; Gregg H. Curry, Comment, Conflicts of Interest Problems for Lawyers
Representing a Class in a Class Action Lawsuit, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 397 (2000); Note, Developments in
the Law—Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1447–57 (1981)
[hereinafter Developments].
3. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.04.
4. See, e.g., id. §§ 15.05–15.20 (discussing communication with class members and potential class
members, including contacts by class counsel and counsel for adversary); Debra Lyn Bassett, PreCertification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36 GA. L. REV. 353 (2002) (same).
5. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility,
Financial Arrangements in Class Actions, and the Code of Professional Responsibility, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 831 (1993); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669 (1986); Heather M. Williams, Note, Attorney Fees in Class Action Lawsuits: Implementing
Change to Protect Plaintiffs from Unethical Attorney Behavior, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 68 (1998).
6. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.23.
7. See, e.g., Waid, supra note 1, at 1048.
8. Koniak, supra note 2, at 1121 (referring to this statement as an “oft-made remark”); see also,
e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589–90 (3d Cir. 1999) (both citing and quoting Agent
Orange and Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in Corn Derivatives); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he traditional rules that have been developed in the course of
attorneys’ representation of the interests of clients outside of the class action context should not be
mechanically applied to the problems that arise in the settlement of class action litigation.”); In re
Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts
cannot mechanically transpose to class actions the rules developed in the traditional lawyer-client
setting context . . . .”).
9. See Lazy Oil Co., 166 F.3d at 589–90.
10. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1981). The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility was replaced by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. See generally
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.4 (1986).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2001) (previous version of the Model Rules prior to
extensive amendments in February 2002 resulting from the recommendations of the Ethics 2000
Commission).

MOORE.DOC

No. 5]

7/28/2003 10:27 AM

“WHO SHOULD REGULATE CLASS ACTION LAWYERS?”

103

class action lawyers to any significant extent.12 Given this lack of
guidance, both the Kutak Commission, which drafted the Model Rules,13
and the Ethics 2000 Commission14 (the Commission), which recently
proposed comprehensive amendments to the Model Rules,15 were urged
to adopt a separate class action rule.16 Neither did so, nor has any state
court adopted such a rule.17 As Chief Reporter to the Ethics 2000
Commission,18 I want to address the question of whether, at this late
date, with all of the publicity surrounding allegations of class action
12. The Model Code contained but a single reference to class actions. See MODEL CODE DR 2104(A)(5) (allowing limited solicitation in class actions). As adopted in 1983, the Model Rules
contained no references to class actions in the text of the rules, and only a few references in the
comments. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. (1983) (referring to law prescribing a
procedure for determining a fee); id. R. 1.8 cmt. (stating that consent to payment of legal fees by third
party “may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure”); id. R. 6.1 cmt. (1983)
(referring to class actions in connection with the provision of pro bono services); id. R. 7.2 cmt. (1983)
(stating that solicitation rules do not prohibit “communications authorized by law, such as notice to
members of a class in class action litigation”). There were no additional references to class actions as
of 2001, and the Ethics 2000 Commission recommended only one additional reference to class actions
in the Comment to Rule 1.7. See infra note 20.
13. See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, § 2.6.4.
14. In 1997, the American Bar Association (ABA) created the Commission on the Evaluation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, generally known as the Ethics 2000 Commission. See E. Norman
Veasey, Chair’s Introduction and Executive Summary, Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l
Conduct, Report with Recommendation to the House of Delegates (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Ethics
2000 Report], at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
The
Commission was charged with conducting a comprehensive review of the Model Rules. See id. The
Commission issued its report in August 2001. The ABA House of Delegates met in August 2001,
again in February 2002, and adopted the vast majority of the Commission’s recommendations. See
Summary of House of Delegates Action on the Ethics 2000 Commission at the August 2001 Annual
Meeting, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
15. Report 401, as filed by the Ethics 2000 Commission in August 2001 and as filed with
revisions in February 2002, can be found at the Commission’s website.
See
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
16. See Waid, supra note 1 (proposal made to Kutak Commission); see also Ethics 2000 Atlanta
Hearing (Aug. 5, 1999) (written statement of Richard A. Zitrin) [hereinafter Zitrin Testimony], at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/rzitrin.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
17. Although no state has adopted a separate class action rule, several states have adopted
additional language in either the text or comments to the rules regarding various aspects of class action
litigation. None of these additions are comprehensive, however. See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 7.3(e) (1996) (adopting provision similar to solicitation exception provision of Model
Code); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 14(A) (2002) (regarding simultaneous
representation of two class actions against a single defendant and the lawyer’s duty to consider
whether the creation of subclasses is required); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 16
(1998) (applying duty of candor in ex parte proceeding to joint petitions to a tribunal, including a joint
petition to approve a class action settlement); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2002)
(specifically exempting class actions from coverage under aggregate settlement rule); TEX. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02 cmt. 3 (1998) (stating that the ability of a class action lawyer to recommend
settlement over the objections of a named plaintiff is an exception to the general rule that it is for the
client to accept or reject settlements). Jurisdictions that follow the Model Code format typically retain
the provision allowing limited solicitation in class actions. See, e.g., IOWA CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (2002). California’s rules, which are not based on either the Model Code
or the Model Rules, have a single reference to class actions. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3-510 (1996) (regarding communication of settlement offer to a client, defining “client” to refer to the
named representatives of a class in a class action).
18. It goes without saying (but I will say it anyway) that this Article represents my own views
only and, except where specifically stated, does not represent the views of the Ethics 2000
Commission.
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abuses,19 the Commission was justified in declining either to adopt a
separate class action rule or to add extensive commentary addressing the
application of the rules to class action lawsuits.20
Not surprisingly, my answer is that yes, the Commission’s silence
was justified,21 although I concede that there are a few places where

19. See, e.g., Tom Collins, Rulings Focus on Public Policy, Ethics in Attorney Cases: Judge Blasts
Attorneys Suing Cruise Line, 224 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 16, 2001, at 4 (reporting judge who
slashed class counsels’ legal fees and ordered that a quarter of the legal fees be paid in the same travel
vouchers to be provided to plaintiff class under negotiated settlement); Karen Donovan, “Huh? I’m
the Lead Plaintiff?” NAT’L L.J., May 24, 1999, at A1 (discussing investor who was put forward as a
“lead plaintiff” without his knowledge or consent and whose lawyers refused to answer his questions
regarding his status in the litigation); Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at
D1 (reporting criticism of class action abuses, including coupon settlements and marginal claims
packaged for the “sole purpose of snaring fat fees”); see also, e.g., Koniak, supra note 2, at 1057–64
(alleging possible collusion between class counsel and defendants in negotiating a “futures class” by
class counsel simultaneously representing inventories of plaintiffs who apparently received a better
deal outside the class settlement); Edwin Lamberth, Injustice by Process: A Look at and Proposals for
the Problems and Abuses of the Settlement Class Action, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 149, 163 (1998) (discussing
numerous alleged abuses, including a case in which an absent class member ended up being assessed
attorneys fees greater than his award in negotiated settlement).
20. The only additional reference to class action lawsuits in the Ethics 2000 Commission
amendments is contained in a new paragraph to the Rule 1.7 Comment. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 25 (2002) (stating that unnamed class members are ordinarily not
considered to be clients for purposes of determining “directly adverse” conflicts; as a result, a lawyer
representing a class may file a lawsuit against an unnamed class member on an unrelated subject
without informing or seeking consent from that member). The Commission considered but rejected a
proposed comment along the lines of the Massachusetts Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (Working Draft No. 5, 1998) (discussing proposed new comment 16A); Minutes of
the Ethics 2000 Commission (Sept. 27-28, 2000), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/092798mtg.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2002). The Commission also considered but rejected a suggestion that a new
paragraph be added to the Rule 4.2 Comment regarding communications by an opposing lawyer with
members of a class in a class action. See MODEL RULES R. 4.2 (Working Draft No. 4, 1998) (discussing
proposed comment 9); Minutes of the Ethics 2000 Commission (July 7-8, 2000), at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/070700mtg.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) (noting that the Commission
decided against adding comment regarding communications with members of a class in a class action).
21. A fuller explanation of the meaning of the Commission’s silence is probably called for,
particularly in light of Richard Zitrin’s testimony, which specifically called for the adoption of a
separate class action rule. The minutes of the Commission’s meetings do not indicate any discussion
of that proposal. Of course the Commission was aware of the proposal, which was made both in
written and oral testimony. See supra note 16 (citing testimony of Richard Zitrin). Accordingly, the
Commission’s silence means that neither the reporters nor any member of the Commission put the
proposal on the Commission’s agenda for discussion. My recollection is that there was informal
discussion that any necessary clarification regarding the ambiguity of the ethical obligations of class
action lawyers should come from law other than the Rules of Professional Conduct. My own views at
the time are reflected in rather brief remarks I made in a symposium on mass torts litigation. See
Nancy J. Moore, Ethics Matters, Too: The Significance of Professional Regulation of Attorney Fees and
Costs in Mass Tort Litigation—A Response to Judith Resnick, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2221–22 (2000)
(acknowledging the failure of lawyer codes to address ethical dilemmas of class action lawyers). That
piece goes on to conclude that “the code format may be insufficiently flexible to adequately
communicate the duties of class action counsel” and further, that:
[g]iven that the resolution of ethical issues often depends on the principles set forth in other law,
it may be preferable to continue to look to courts to provide further guidance, either by
promulgating additional procedural rules or by addressing the ethical obligations of class lawyers
while ruling on various procedural aspects of class action litigation.
Id. In writing this Article, however, I have engaged in additional research, reflection, and discussion
with colleagues. Thus, this Article reflects my current thinking, which is similar, but not identical, to
the views I earlier held and expressed.
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additional commentary would have been useful.22 There are two reasons
for my answer. First, I believe that much of the confusion surrounding
the application of the ethics rules to class action lawyers could be
significantly reduced without revising the ethics rules. In my view, this
could be done by resolving the issue of client identification in favor of
the view that the class is an entity client,23 even at the precertification
stage of the litigation,24 and by recognizing that much of what are
currently described as “conflicts of interest” issues are in fact the type of
agency problems that were never meant to be resolved under conflict-ofinterest doctrine.25 Second, acknowledging that there are some situations
in which relaxation (or special application) of the ethics rules may be
necessary to accommodate the unique needs of a class action lawsuit, I
believe that whether and when such rules are to be relaxed is a question
more properly decided under the law of class actions—primarily Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure26 (FRCP) and the case law
applying that rule—rather than under rules of professional conduct or by
ethics committees and courts applying such rules.27

22. For example, the Commission considered a proposal drafted by Associate Reporter Carl
Pierce to add a paragraph to the Rule 4.2 Comment to indicate how that Rule applied to class actions.
See MODEL RULES R. 4.2, at 3, 9 (Proposed Rule 4.2 Draft No. 4, 1998) (discussing proposed
Comment 9). Under that proposal, after either certification of the class or expiration of the opt-out
period, a lawyer representing a client in a class action must treat all class members as persons
represented by the lawyer who is representing the class; prior to that period, the rule would apply only
to communications with members of the class known to be individually represented by a lawyer. Id.
The proposal was based primarily on the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which in turn
reflected the majority of court decisions addressing this issue. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99, cmt. l & Reporter’s Note (2000). Given that the issue has been addressed
by courts overseeing class actions, and that there appears to be a clear majority opinion, I believe it
would have been helpful to practicing lawyers if the Rule 4.2 Comment had adopted this approach. I
would, however, prefer to word the provision differently in order to avoid the implication that postcertification class members are in fact clients of class counsel. In my view, it would have been better to
treat individual class members as constituents of the class and the class itself as the lawyer’s client. See
infra text accompanying note 53.
23. See infra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 71–83 and accompanying text.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For a summary of the general requirements of Rule 23, as completely
revised in 1966, see Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1970). Class action law also
includes constitutional concerns; for example, due process requirements for binding absent members
of the class. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999) (stating that mandatory
class actions implicate the due process principle that a person is not bound by a judgment in personam
in litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process and that there is an applicable exception for class actions that depends on adequate
representation by someone with same interests who is not a party); see also Koniak, supra note 2, at
1086–1126 (discussing Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence as applied to district court opinion
in class action involving attempted settlement of class composed of persons who had not yet suffered
injury from asbestos exposure).
27. In some instances, the application of rules of professional conduct and class action law will
overlap, as when a judge determines the size of a reasonable fee to be awarded to class counsel in a
class action lawsuit. Cf. Moore, supra note 21, at 2222 n.61 (suggesting that judges ruling on class
action issues may also expand on the ethical duties of lawyers, as when “stating the circumstances
under which lawyers are entitled to be reimbursed for the costs and expenses of litigation”). In other
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In this article, I focus on the issue that dominates many discussions
of ethics and class actions—the difficulty of applying current conflict-ofinterest rules to the myriad of conflicting interests that commonly arise in
class action lawsuits, including conflicts among class members, as well as
between the lawyer and the class and between the class and third
persons. Parts I and II of the article demonstrate that the scope of the
problem is not nearly as large as it is commonly thought to be. In part I,
I argue that the class should be viewed as an entity client, in which case it
becomes clear that conflict-of-interest rules simply do not apply to
conflicts within a class. In part II, I eliminate from consideration those
conflicts—like conflicts arising from the size of the lawyer’s fee—that are
not addressed by conflict-of-interest doctrine because they are not
unique to particular lawyers but are rather a type of agency problem that
is endemic to legal practice.
Parts III and IV of the article then turn to the types of conflicts that
would be addressed by a “strict reading” of the conflict-of-interest rules.
These conflicts include those arising from the lawyer’s duties to other
current clients, both inside and outside the class, as well as former clients.
In part III, I argue that from the point of view of the nonclass client, that
there is no reason to relax the current conflict rules. These clients are
entitled to full disclosure of the conflict and an opportunity to find
independent counsel (or, in some cases, to refuse to bring the action as a
class action). Finally, in part IV, I address these conflicts from the point
of view of the class itself. Here I agree that relaxation (or special
application) of the conflict rules is probably warranted, because,
although there are risks associated with the conflict, there may be some
situations in which the risk is low in relation to the benefit the class may
receive by permitting the representation to continue. I consider several
ways to achieve this end, arguing that it makes the most sense to leave
these issues to be resolved under class action law—namely, under the
rubric of a further elaboration of the adequacy of representation
requirement of FRCP Rule 23. Although I urge that it is class action law
that should regulate this aspect of class counsels’ conflicts, I explain why
I think it would be useful for courts to consider the principles and
concepts underlying the ethics rules in their Rule 23 analysis.
I.

THE CLASS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN ENTITY CLIENT

Much of the confusion surrounding the ethics of class action lawyers
results from a mistaken belief that a “strict reading” of the ethics rules
would make class action litigation either impossible or highly inefficient.
Consider the question of conflicts of interest. It is undeniable that
conflicts of interest are inherent in class actions, as it is inevitable that
instances, the application of class action law will be similar to, but not identical, to an analysis that
would be conducted under rules of professional conduct. See infra Part IV.
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there will be divergent interests among the various members of the class
itself, particularly in the remedy stage.28 Nevertheless, it is not
necessarily the case that such conflicts would doom class actions if the
conflict-of-interest rules are strictly applied in class action lawsuits.
Model Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules is the general ethical rule
addressing concurrent conflicts of a lawyer.29 Under this Rule, a
potentially impermissible conflict exists whenever “there is a significant
risk that the representation of one or more clients may be materially
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”30 Given such a
conflict, the lawyer must refuse the representation, or withdraw from
existing representation, unless “each affected client gives informed
consent” and the “lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client.”31 According to Brian Waid, an early proponent of a separate
class action rule, Rule 1.7, if strictly construed, would prevent lawyers
from handling class actions at all because “‘the lawyers’ ability to
consider, recommend or carry out a course of action’ on behalf of the
class, a subclass or the class representative may be ‘adversely affected by
the lawyer’s responsibilities’ to one of the other categories of ‘clients.’”32
Moreover, such “conflicts” cannot be cured by informed consent, due to
the lawyer’s inability to obtain the consent of absent class members.33
28. See, e.g., Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“[C]onflicts of interest are built into the device of the class action, where a single lawyer may be
representing a class consisting of thousands of persons not all of whom will have identical interests or
views.”); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 11.12, at
11–33 (3d ed. 2002) (“It is almost inevitable that class members will have some divergent views on the
advisability of settlement and other issues.”); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The
Role of Plaintiff’s Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1483–1500 (1998)
(arguing the unreality of suggestion that due process prohibits conflicts among class members).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
30. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002).
31. Id. R 1.7(b) (2002).
32. Waid, supra note 1, at 1071–72 (quoting ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (proposed final draft May
30, 1981)). As a result of the 2002 amendments recommended by the Ethics 2000 Commission, Rule
1.7 has been reorganized; however, with the exception of a new requirement that waivers be confirmed
in writing, there was no intended change in substance. See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 14. Waid
was commenting on an earlier draft of the 1983 version of Rule 1.7. Waid, supra note 1, at 1049 n.8
and accompanying text (referring to May 30, 1981 proposed final draft).
33. Cf. Waid, supra note 1, at 1072 (discussing “conflict” created by class counsel’s interest in
recovery of fees). Waid does not discuss the comment to Rule 1.8(f), which provides, with respect to
third party payment of legal fees, that “[w]here the client is a class, consent may be obtained on behalf
of the class by court-supervised procedure.” ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 1.8 Comment (proposed final draft May 30, 1981); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. (2001). The reason may be either that he was
unaware of this provision, that he thought the provision applied only to consent given under that rule,
or that he was aware that courts have not developed any procedures to consent to conflicts affecting a
class. That statement has been eliminated from the Rule 1.8 Comment as a result of the 2002
amendments. See id. R. 1.8 cmt. (2002).
In Part IV of this Article, I consider, but ultimately reject, the use of consent by a court or
supervised by a court as a means of satisfying the requirements of Rule 1.7 in class actions. In my
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Under this analysis, it is self-evident that a strict reading of the conflict
rules must be tempered if the inherently diverging interests in class
actions are to be accommodated.34
But this analysis assumes that each class member is or should be
considered a “client” for purposes of this Rule.35 There is no single view
of who is the “client” of a class action lawyer.36 According to the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, the named class
representatives are clients of the lawyers for some purposes,37 and even
other class members may have “some characteristics” of clients.38 At
least one court has declared that there is “in effect” an “attorney-client
relationship between the absent class members and the attorney.”39
But these are strained and unhelpful readings of many of the cases.
The problem with characterizing either named representatives or

view, when the question is one of protecting the members of the class who are not otherwise
represented by the lawyer, it is better to suspend application of the conflicts rules, deferring to a
judicial determination of the adequacy of representation under Rule 23—a determination that should
be “informed by” the concepts of those rules but that does not literally apply the rules. See infra Part
IV.
34. Cf. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON THE SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, FINAL REPORT 28
n. 69 (2002) [hereinafter SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL] (describing result in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco
Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999)).
35. Waid, supra note 1, at 1071 (lamenting that the word “client” remains undefined for
purposes of a class action).
36. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.03 (discussing three different perspectives
on relationship between class representative or counsel and absent class members); Developments,
supra note 2, at 1449–54 (discussing various unitary and multiple client theories). The issue is
addressed only indirectly in the Model Rules, with ambiguous and conflicting implications. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES R. 1.7 cmt. 25 (2002) (“When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of
plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not
considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying [the “directly adverse” conflicts
provision] of this Rule.”); id. R. 1.8 cmt. 13 (2002) (“Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or
defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each
member of the class.”); id. R. 7.3 cmt. 4 (2002) (stating that rules prohibiting solicitation of clients “do
not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action
litigation”). This ambiguity and conflict merely reflect the unsettled state of the law as reflected in
other sources. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt f. (2000). There is a
cross-reference here to § 125, Comment f, for conflict of interest issues, but that section does not
address the question of who is the client in a class action lawsuit.
38. Id. § 14 cmt. f. The cross-references here are to § 70, Comment c (providing indirect support
for the proposition that the confidential communications of a class action member to the class lawyer
may be privileged) and to § 99, Comment l (stating that opposing counsel may not be free to
communicate with class members except through class action counsel). In my view, rather than
characterizing these sections as treating class members as clients, or as having characteristics of clients,
it would be better to view them as recognizing that class members are constituents of an entity client—
the class—just as individual corporate employees are constituents of a corporate client, who may
provide privileged communications to corporate counsel and be off-limits to opposing clients under
the no-contact rule. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981) (holding that
certain corporate employees’ communications to corporate counsel were privileged communications
of the corporation); MODEL RULES R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (application of no-contact rule to prevent
contact with certain constituents of an organizational client).
39. Cullen v. New York Civil Serv. Comm’n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); see also
Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., 541 F.2d 832, 834–35 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The class is not the client.
The class attorney continues to have responsibilities to each individual member of the class . . . .”).
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unnamed members of the class as “clients,” or even as having the
“characteristics of clients” in some cases, is that for the purposes that
appear to count most, these persons are not treated like clients. Most
notably, class counsel can recommend a settlement over the objections of
the named representatives.40 As a result, it is hard to see how even
named representatives can be considered “clients” of the lawyer in any
meaningful sense of the word. Moreover, viewing the class as an entity
client is not inconsistent with recognizing that class counsel has
significant responsibilities to the individual class members, just as
viewing an estate as an entity client does not preclude a finding that the
estate lawyer has responsibilities to either the fiduciary or the
beneficiaries.41 As for decisions prohibiting opposing counsel from
contacting class members directly, the same result could be achieved
without characterizing class members as “clients” or having
“characteristics of clients.”42
In my opinion, the better view is that the class itself is an entity
client, just as corporations, partnerships, and other voluntary (and even
involuntary43) associations may be entity clients under Rule 1.13.44 This
view has not been explicitly adopted except by a handful of
commentators,45 but I believe that it has the best fit with class action case

40.
41.

See, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1450.
Cf. Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1319, 1335 (1994) (referring to how Model Rule 1.13 envisions the question of who
is the attorney’s client). But see Mandujano, 541 F.2d at 834 (noting that the class “is not a legal
entity”).
42. Cf. MODEL RULES R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (applying no-contact rule to prohibit contacts with
certain constituents of an organizational client).
43. See, e.g., Pennell, supra note 41, at 1335 (“Nothing in the operation of Model Rule 1.13
suggests . . . that voluntariness is a requisite to recognition as an organization for purposes of applying
this rule.”); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV
913, 921–22 (1998) (referring to some entities that are not truly voluntary, such a trade unions and
municipalities).
44. MODEL RULES R. 1.13(a) (2002) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”); id. R. 1.13(a) cmt. 1
(2002) (describing organizational client as a “legal entity [that] cannot act except through its officers,
directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents”). I prefer the term “entity” to
“organization” and will use that term throughout this Article. See also sources cited infra note 45.
The fact that a class can also be viewed as an aggregate or group of individuals does not in itself defeat
the concept of a class as an entity client. Cf. ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 91-361 n.2 (1991) (stating that partnerships are entity clients under Rule 1.13, even though
“for some purposes, often involving the substantive rights and liabilities of partners, a partnership is
treated as an ‘aggregate’ or group of individuals”).
45. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13 (1996); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients
or Law, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 177, 178–79 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Shapiro, supra note 43, at
923–34. But see Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., 541 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The class is
not the client.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 380–99 (2000) (arguing that viewing the class as
an entity is a legal fiction that is neither useful nor plausible); Developments, supra note 2, at 1450–51
(characterizing the view of class as a legal entity as one of several “unitary client” theories, but then
rejecting this view).
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law46 and provides the most workable solution for purposes of applying
the ethics rules.
Indeed, it fits nicely with recently proposed
amendments to FRCP Rule 23, under which a new paragraph (g) clearly
states that “[a]n attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class.”47 As further
explained in the Committee Note, this provision “articulates the
obligation of class counsel to represent the interests of the class, as
opposed to the potentially conflicting interests of individual class
members.”48
Of course, by its terms, proposed Rule 23(g) would apply only after
a lawyer is appointed as class counsel—that is, after the certification
stage of a class action lawsuit.49 Who is the lawyer’s client prior to
certification? Must it be the named representatives? In my view, it is
possible for the lawyer to view even the putative class as a client, or
better yet, a prospective client.50 This is apparently what is contemplated
by proposed Rule 23(g), as evidenced by the drafters’ acknowledgment
that “[b]efore certification, counsel may undertake actions tentatively on
behalf of the class,” such as “discussion of a possible settlement of the
action by counsel before the class is certified.”51 According to the
drafters, such “pre-certification activities anticipate later appointment as
class counsel.”52 Moreover, “by later applying for such appointment
counsel is representing to the court that the activities were undertaken in
the best interests of the class,” and “[b]y presenting such a precertification settlement for approval under Rule 23(e) and seeking
appointment as class counsel, for example, counsel represents that the

46. In particular, it fits with the case law holding that class counsel can recommend a settlement
over the objection of the named representatives. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1450. If the
named representatives cannot veto a settlement, then in my view it makes no sense to call them the
clients of class counsel. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) (2002) (“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”). And if the named representatives are
not the clients, and the class as an entity is not the client, then does class counsel have no client at all?
See Donovan, supra note 19 (quoting class action lawyer William S. Lerach as having said to Forbes
magazine, “‘I have the greatest practice in the world. I have no clients.’”). For a discussion of both
the entity client theory and the case law treating class members like clients for purposes of the nocontact rule, see supra note 38.
47. Letter from David F. Levi, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Report of the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee], at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf (last
visited Feb. 17, 2003). The proposal has been approved by the Judicial Conference and is currently
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1202.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2003).
48. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 47, at 110 (Committee Note)
(emphasis added).
49. Id. at 108.
50. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.18 (2002) (clarifying lawyers duties regarding confidentiality
and conflicts of interests with regard to prospective clients).
51. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 47, at 281.
52. Id.
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settlement provisions are fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class.”53
This result is analogous to decisions finding that a lawyer who forms a
corporation can be deemed retroactively to have represented the
corporation, even in the period prior to incorporation.54
If the class itself is an entity client, something like a corporation,55
then the named class representatives are constituents of the class, more
like corporate officers or directors than individual clients. Continuing
with the analogy, the absent class members can then be viewed as akin to
corporate shareholders. Under this view, Model Rule 1.7 simply does
not—nor should it—apply to conflicts of interest within the class itself,
just as it does not apply to the possibly conflicting interests of the
members of the board of directors or the shareholders of a corporate
client.56
To be sure, a class differs from other types of entity clients under
Model Rule 1.13.57 For one thing, it is the court, rather than a decisionmaking body within the class itself, that is empowered to make decisions
normally reserved for clients.58 In addition, class members differ from
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992). I disagree with this case in its
holding that once the corporation is created, it becomes the only client, displacing the corporate
organizers, who become “retroactive non-clients.” Whether the lawyer should be viewed as having
represented both the corporation and one or more of the individual incorporators should depend on
the facts of each case, e.g., whether the lawyer expressly or impliedly agreed to represent both or
whether the incorporator reasonably believed that the lawyer was representing her individually. See
generally Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to ‘Non-Clients’: Reconceptualizing the
Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45
S.C. L. REV. 659 (1994). For an interpretation of Jesse more amenable to this view, see Note, An
Expectations Approach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687, 696 (1993) (“Treating preincorporation individual representation, absent evidence to the contrary, as entity representation
accords with an organizer’s reasonable expectations during the incorporation phase of the company’s
existence.” (emphasis added)).
55. A class may be “something like” a corporation, but there are significant differences. See
infra note 98 and accompanying text.
56. Thus, application of Rule 4.2 merely requires identification of which members of the class
constitute the client for purposes of the rule precluding an adversary from contacting the client
without the consent of the class attorney. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7
(2002) (applying Rule 4.2 in the case of an organization client like a corporation); see also infra note
98.
57. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to adopt the entity client in order to conclude that Rule
1.7 does not apply to conflicts of interest within the class itself. That view is, in effect, what courts
have been doing when they suspend “strict application” of the conflicts rule for various purposes. See,
e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text. One important advantage of the entity view, however, is
that it makes it relatively easy to apply Rule 1.7 to conflicts that pit the interests of the class as a whole
against either the lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer’s duties to another client or a third person. See
infra Part II.
Koniak and Cohen suggest that Rule 1.13 is geared too much toward the representation of large,
publicly held corporations, and thus does not adequately guide lawyers when representing other
entities, such as partnerships and limited liability entities. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 183–
85. An additional difficulty in representing a class as an entity is the lack of a well-developed body of
law that structures the entity, which would make it easier to determine how lawyers should conduct
themselves in the representation. See id. at 185.
58. Thus, the court determines whether a class action can be maintained, when and how the
members of the class receive notice of the class action, whether the class will be divided into
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either management or shareholders of a corporation because their rights
are directly adjudicated in the class action lawsuit.59 Moreover,
characterizing the class itself as an entity client does not by itself solve
the problem of delineating the duties owed by class counsel to the named
and absent members of the class, and class counsel certainly need more
direction than current law provides.60 As a result, one could argue that
just as lawyers owe some ethical duties to some non-clients, such as
prospective clients,61 the Model Rules should include either
modifications of Rule 1.7 to extend its reach to conflicts within a class62
or a separate class action rule that delineates class counsel’s duties with
respect to such conflicts.63
subclasses, and when a class can be dismissed or compromised. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)–(e). In
addition, the court appoints class counsel and determines the fee award. See, e.g., COURT AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES: REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 237, 256–57
(1985); SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, supra note 34.
59. In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that at least some conflicts
among members require the creation of subclasses, with separate representation, and it is the lawyer’s
duty to bring these conflicts to the attention of the court. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 626–28 (1997). Finally, it should be noted that the definition of the class—i.e., determining
who is a member and who is not—is entirely within the control of the lawyer, at least initially. See,
e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 178 (noting that “class counsel plays an important, and
typically exclusive, role in selecting and controlling the class representatives and shaping the size and
purpose of the enterprise”). For a detailed discussion of the problems inherent in one effort to control
the shape of the class, apparently for the benefit of class counsel, see Koniak, supra note 2, at 1137–45
(questioning why three of the named representatives in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d
610 (3d Cir. 1996), were not included in inventory cases settled outside the class for higher damages
than they would receive as class members).
60. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 193 (stating that class action law fails to provide
sufficient structure for regulation of class as entity).
61. See MODEL RULES R. 1.18 (2002) (detailing duties to prospective clients, including conflict of
interest duties less stringent than those owed to clients or former clients).
62. See e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 14A (2002).
A lawyer who undertakes to represent a class should make an initial determination whether
subclasses within the class should have separate representation because their interests differ in
material respects from other segments of the class. Moreover, the lawyer who initially determines
that subclasses are not necessary should revisit that determination as the litigation or settlement
discussions proceed because as discovery or settlement talks proceed the interests of subgroups
may begin to diverge significantly. . . . The lawyer has the responsibility to request that separate
representation be provided to protect the interests of subgroups within the class.
Id.
63. Neither Waid nor Zitrin provided any particular specificity regarding the content of such a
rule. Waid proposed a new Rule 3.10 as follows:
Rule 3.10 Responsibility of Class Counsel
The lawyer representing a class of individuals in a class action owes a primary duty of loyalty to
members of the class defined by the original pleadings filed on behalf of the class, until such
definition is amended by leave of court.
Waid, supra note 1, at 1075. Such a rule would give only the vaguest of direction to class action
lawyers, but according to Waid, would “provid[e] a foundation for the orderly development of a body
of ethical opinions and comments” and “would also provide courts with a more stable ground on
which to evaluate the conduct of class counsel in appropriate cases.” Id. I do not find his proposal to
provide much guidance at all. For example, I do not understand what it means to say that class
counsel “owes a primary duty of loyalty to the members of the class” (as opposed to the class as a
whole—as an entity), because individuals within the class are bound to have differing interests, no
matter how many subclasses are created. Id. Indeed the proposed rule creates additional
uncertainties, e.g., the implied suggestion that ethics rules impose even greater obligations on the part
of lawyers toward individual class members than does class action law, which already provides that
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Before addressing the question of whether such direction should
come from ethics law or from other law, it is important to consider
possible conflicts of interest other than those within the class itself—that
is, conflicts that pit the interests of the class as a whole against either the
lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer’s duties to another client or third
person. Here, too, there has been needless confusion regarding the
“strict application” of conflict-of-interest rules to class action lawsuits.
This confusion results from the failure to recognize that not all conflicts
of interest are meant to be addressed by the conflict-of-interest doctrine
that is embodied in rules of professional conduct.
II. CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST DOCTRINE APPLIES TO SOME, BUT NOT
ALL CONFLICTS INVOLVING THE CLASS ITSELF
Aside from conflicts within a class, situations that are often viewed
as creating at least a potential conflict-of-interest include “a prior
relationship with the named defendant in the class action; . . . a greater
concern for receiving a fee than for pursuing the class claim; and . . . the
settlement of claims by collusion rather than through a fair process
where class members’ interests are adequately represented.”64 Other
situations include: the simultaneous representation by class counsel of
the class itself and individual clients either inside or outside of the class;65
representation by former class counsel of dissident class members
objecting to a proposed settlement;66 class counsel serving as class
representative;67 and the simultaneous negotiation of a class settlement
and class counsel’s attorneys fees.68
All these situations involve conflicts between the class (an entity
client) and either the lawyer’s self-interest or the lawyer’s duties to
another person. Therefore, on its face, Model Rule 1.7 would seem to
class counsel has a fiduciary duty toward individual class members. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30 (1995) (stating that “attorneys and parties seeking to represent the class
assume fiduciary responsibilities, and the court bears a residual responsibility to protect the interests
of class members”).
Zitrin did not propose any specific language at all, but rather urged the adoption of an ethics rule
directly addressing representation of a class, utilizing existing case law as a basis for determining the
content of such a rule. Zitrin Testimony, supra note 16. Aside from its lack of specificity, I have two
problems with the Zitrin approach. First, I do not believe that the nuances of class action law can be
adequately captured in code format. See Moore, supra note 21, at 2222 (noting that “code format may
be insufficiently flexible to adequately communicate the duties of class action counsel”). Second, I
believe that the obligations of class action counsel toward the members of the class should be codified
or otherwise formulated by those who draft, interpret, and apply rules of civil procedure, as well as the
constitutional underpinnings of class action law, and not by those who draft, interpret, and apply rules
of professional ethics. See infra Part IV.
64. Curry, supra note 2, at 397.
65. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.24.
66. Id. § 15.25.
67. Id. § 15.23.
68. Id. § 15.31; see also David Brainerd Parrish, Comment, The Dilemma: Simultaneous
Negotiation of Attorneys’ Fees and Settlement in Class Actions, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 531 (1999).
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apply.69 Indeed, in some of these situations, courts have reiterated the
need to relax the conflict rules to accommodate class action lawsuits.70
Once again, however, it will be helpful to prune away some situations in
which traditional conflicts rules do not (and should not) apply, in order
to better determine whether and when a strict reading of these rules
poses insurmountable difficulties for class actions. Here I want to
distinguish between “conflicts of interest” in the broad sense, which
economists characterize as a form of agency problem,71 and the far
narrower “conflict-of-interest doctrine,” which is found in Rule 1.7 and
the other conflicts rules.72
Conflicts of interest are pervasive in legal practice, and yet only
some of these conflicts are regulated by traditional conflict-of-interest
doctrine. For example, there is always conflict between the client’s
interest in having the lawyer devote the most time possible to the client’s
cause at the lowest possible price and the lawyer’s interest in devoting
the least possible time at the highest possible price. Yet, the types of
conflicts that are inherent in establishing fees or in determining how
much time to allocate to a client’s cause (when the lawyer could be
devoting time to another client’s matter or to the lawyer’s own leisure
time) are not addressed by Rule 1.773 or by any other conflict-of-interest
rule.74 They are typical of what economists characterize as agency
problems—that is, “the misalignment of interests between agents, such as

69. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
70. For example, courts have permitted former class counsel to represent dissident members of a
class in opposition to the class itself, even though the conflict rules prohibit representation adverse to a
former client. See infra Part III.
71. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 186.
72. See generally Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can Learn from Lawyers About Conflicts of
Interest, 81 B.U. L. REV. 445 (2001) (comparing doctors’ and lawyers’ responses to conflict of interest
problems).
73. Prior to the extensive amendments to the Model Rules in February, 2002, the Comment to
Rule 1.7 did state that “a lawyer’s need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters
that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.7 cmt. 6 (2001). The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended that the sentence be deleted on the
explicit ground that “conflicts between lawyers and prospective clients regarding fee arrangements are
typically addressed not by ‘conflict of interest’ rules but rather by Rule 1.5, which regulates fees
directly.” American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, Reporter’s Explanation of Changes of
R. 1.7, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule17rem.html (last visited May 10, 2003). For a further
discussion of the inappropriateness of treating fee arrangements under Rule 1.7 rather than under
Rule 1.5, see Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259,
286–90 (1997) (acknowledging the Rule 1.7 Comment but concurring with Silver’s conclusion, see
infra, that such fees should not be viewed as presenting a conflict of interest problem under Rule 1.7);
Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the
Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205 (1997) (criticizing ethics opinion
declaring unethical bundled flat fees offered by insurers for representation of insureds).
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2002) (“Conflict of Interest: Current Clients:
Specific Rules”); id. R. 1.9 (2002) (“Duties to Former Clients”); id. R. 1.10 (2002) (“Imputation of
Conflicts of Interest: General Rule”); id. R. 1.11 (2002) (“Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and
Current Government Officers and Employees”); id. R. 1.12 (2002) (“Former Judge, Arbitrator,
Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral”).
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lawyers, and principals, their clients . . . .”75 These types of agency
problems—the inevitable ones—permeate legal and other professional
practice. How they should be regulated is much disputed, but to a large
extent they are controllable only by relying on lawyers’ professionalism
and their willingness to exercise good judgment and self-restraint.76 In
any event, they are not regulated by conflict-of-interest rules, which
prohibit the lawyer from undertaking the representation absent the
informed consent of the client.77
Conflict-of-interest rules do “not purport to regulate circumstances
that are common to all lawyers, but only circumstances that are unique to
specific lawyers.”78 In other words, as I have said elsewhere,79 “conflictof-interest doctrine in law does not address the largely unavoidable
conflicts, but only those that can be avoided or removed, by permitting
(or requiring) clients to seek out other lawyers, that is, lawyers who are
not burdened with a particular conflict of interest.”80 As a result,
returning to the class action context, class counsel who has a unique
conflict (for example, a lawyer who had a prior relationship with the
defendant81) is governed by conflict-of-interest doctrine, but lawyers with
unavoidable conflicts (for example, conflicts arising from potentially
enormous fees82 or simultaneous negotiation of a class settlement and
class counsel’s attorneys fees83) are not.
Under this view, Rule 1.7 has no direct relevance to determining the
appropriate mechanism for compensating class counsel84 or determining
75. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 186.
76. See Moore, supra note 72, at 450–51. To the extent that lawyers’ conduct can be regulated in
these areas of inevitable conflict, the regulations consist of requirements that lawyers represent clients
competently; with reasonable diligence and promptness; and that they charge fees that are reasonable.
MODEL RULES R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.5 (2002). The structure of such regulation is fundamentally different than
the structure of conflict-of-interest rules, which forbid the lawyer from undertaking the representation
absent the client’s informed consent. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7 (2002).
77. See supra notes 73–74.
78. Moore, supra note 72, at 451 (emphasis added).
79. See generally id.
80. Id. at 451.
81. See, e.g., Palumbo v. Telecomms, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 129 (D.D.C. 1994).
82. See supra note 27.
83. The conflict of interests is obvious, because “[e]very dollar of reasonable fees awarded serves
naturally to reduce the recovery fund available to the class.” NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, §
15.31. For a review of different approaches that have been suggested to deal with this problem, see
Parrish, supra note 68. None of these approaches relies on an analysis of the conflict under Rule 1.7.
84. A draft of the Third Circuit Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel reported that “fee
arrangements generally may create conflicts of interest between lawyers and clients,” invoking the
“material limitation” definition of a conflict under Rule 1.7. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON THE
SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, DRAFT REPORT 26 & n.54 (2001). The Final Draft deleted the
explicit reference to Rule 1.7 but continues to refer to conflict of interest concerns arising from the size
of potential fees in class actions as creating “a material limitation on [class counsels’] responsibilities to
their clients.” SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, supra note 34, at 26–27. Although the change is an
improvement, it would have been even better to delete the indirect reference to Rule 1.7’s material
limitation conflicts. Instead, the rule should rely on the notion of conflicts between class counsel and
the class regarding fee arrangements as a type of agency problem that is particularly acute in class
action cases, where the ability of the client to monitor the lawyer is severely curtailed. See supra note
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whether simultaneous negotiation of a class settlement and attorneys
fees should be permitted.85 Of course, it is conceivable that the Model
Rules could contain a separate class action rule directing lawyer conduct
in the face of such conflicts, but the direction would proceed in an
entirely different manner than the conflict-of-interest rules.86 Moreover,
as I will subsequently argue, it may be better that such direction come
from class action law, rather than from the ethical rules themselves.87
Before leaving current conflict-of-interest doctrine, however, I want
to acknowledge that there are some situations in which the doctrine does
properly apply to lawyers handling class action lawsuits. Here I agree
that the continued viability of class actions may sometimes require
relaxation—or special application—of the conflicts rules, but I will
further argue that this is not always the case. Indeed, it is important to
consider the crucial role that traditional ethics rules play in protecting
individual clients whom a class lawyer may choose to represent in
addition to representing the class as a whole.88
III. WHEN CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST DOCTRINE DOES APPLY, THE
VIABILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS MAY, BUT DOES NOT ALWAYS,
REQUIRE RELAXATION (OR SPECIAL APPLICATION) OF THE CONFLICTS
RULES
Conflicts within a class and those arising from the method of
determining the lawyer’s fee are not regulated by conflict-of-interest
doctrine under rules of professional conduct; with respect to these types
of conflicts, it is unnecessary to relax or revise the conflicts rules to
permit lawyers to represent a class. But there are other types of conflicts
that do fall within the proper purview of Model Rule 1.7 and the other
conflict-of-interest rules. For example, class counsel may have had an
attorney-client relationship with the defendant,89 or with another person,
6 and accompanying text (arguing that conflicts of interest in fee arrangements should be viewed as
governed by Rule 1.5, not Rule 1.7).
85. See supra note 84. Similarly, under this view, modifying Rule 1.7 to cover the lawyer’s duties
regarding conflicts within a class does not make sense, because class members are not “clients” within
the meaning of that rule. See supra Part I (arguing that the class should be viewed as an entity client).
Moreover, such a modification would also not make sense because these conflicts are not unique to a
particular lawyer. As a result, they cannot be regulated through the informed consent of the client.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 76 (distinguishing structure of conflict-of-interest rules that focus on client
consent after consultation and other, more direct regulation, such as Rule 1.5(a), which requires that
lawyer fees be reasonable).
87. See infra Part IV.
88. Although I refer here (and subsequently) to “individual” clients, I do not mean to exclude
entity clients such as corporations and partnerships. I use the term “individual” to better distinguish
between representation of the class itself and representation of other clients, both inside and outside
the class.
89. See, e.g., Curry, supra note 2, at 399–401 (discussing Palumbo v. Tele-Communications, Inc.,
157 F.R.D. 129 (D.D.C. 1994), where court disqualified plaintiff class counsel on ground that he had
previously been a part owner and board member of one of the defendant company’s affiliates); see
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perhaps a class member, who might have been named as a defendant.90
Indeed, it is not uncommon for lawyers representing a class to
simultaneously represent some, but not all of the individual members of
the class91 or to simultaneously represent the class and other clients suing
the same defendant with similar92 or different claims.93
Consider, for example, In re Agent Orange,94 in which a plaintiff’s
management committee moved to disqualify counsel representing class
members who opposed the proposed settlement, on the ground that the
lawyers had previously served as class counsel (along with several other
lawyers). One of the lawyers had participated in negotiating the
proposed settlement on behalf of the class, and both had served as
members of the plaintiffs’ management committee.95 In considering the
motion to disqualify, the court noted that traditional principles in
nonclass action litigation support disqualification whenever “‘the former
client . . . show[s] no more than that the matters embraced within the
pending suit wherein his former attorney appears . . . are substantially
related to the matters or cause of action where the attorney previously
represented him, the former client.’”96 These principles parallel Rule 1.9
of the Model Rules, which prohibits an attorney from undertaking
representation adverse to a former client in the same or a substantially
related matter.97

also In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 133 F.R.D. 425, 430 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dictum)
(“There is no question that prior representation of an adversary in a current matter might give rise to a
conflict of interest, especially where the prior representation would enable counsel to disclose
confidences.”).
90. See, e.g., Tedesco v. Mishkin, 689 F. Supp. 1327, 1338, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (A proposed
class representative who had been named as co-trustee of one of the investment trusts involved in the
class action could not serve as a representative of the plaintiff class; the class counsel had to withdraw
from representing that co-trustee in his individual capacity.).
91. See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 1982) (The lead class counsel
represented a number of the named representatives individually in this employment discrimination
action; all but one dismissed him as their attorney because of objections to the proposed settlement.).
92. E.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d sub nom.
Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (The class counsel represented inventories of the
plaintiffs with asbestos claims who were not included in the class as defined in the proposed
settlement.). For an extensive discussion of this decision, see Koniak, supra note 2.
93. E.g., Jackshaw Pontiac, Inc. v. Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 102 F.R.D. 183, 190–93 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (The class counsel also represented the plaintiffs in another action against the
defendants—a state court suit brought by the former, rather than the current employees; the former
employees and proposed class were seeking to tap the same pool of defendant assets.). Sometimes
class counsel attempt to represent two separate classes with different claims against the same
defendant. See, e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 826–31 (1st Cir. 1987) (disqualifying legal
services organization from representing a class of female inmates in a gender discrimination action
against the state of New Hampshire because it simultaneously represented a class of mentally retarded
residents of a state school suing the state over the conditions at the school).
94. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 16–17.
96. Id. at 17 (quoting T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2002) (“A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
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Given that class counsel formerly represented the class,98 it follows
that under a strict reading of Rule 1.9, these lawyers would have been
prohibited from representing dissident class members in an action
adverse to the class. Moreover, outside the class action context, these
lawyers would normally have been disqualified from continuing the
representation.99 Nevertheless, the Agent Orange court did not grant the
motion to disqualify, invoking Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in In re
Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation,100 in which he noted that “although
automatic disqualification might ‘promote the salutary ends of
confidentiality and loyalty, it would have a serious adverse effect on class
actions.’”101 This is so because “the class action may be the only practical
means of vindicating [the] rights [of many individuals with small claims]”
and “[i]n such class actions, often only the attorneys who have
represented the class, rather than any of the class members themselves,
have substantial familiarity with the prior proceedings, the fruits of

substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of
the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”).
98. It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the court viewed class counsel as having
formerly represented the class as an entity or its individual members. There is certainly some
language suggesting that the court believed there was an attorney-client relationship between counsel
and each of the members of the class. See Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18 (stating that by taking a
position favoring one faction of the class, the attorney is “opposing the interests of some of his former
clients in the very matter in which he has represented them”). Under the entity view of class
representation, class counsel seeking to represent dissident class members attacking a settlement
approved by the court might argue that he is not actually opposing his former client—the class—but
rather is seeking to advance a different view of what action is in the best interests of the class. The
situation is analogous to a lawyer for a corporation who attempts to represent the plaintiffs in a
shareholder derivative action brought against corporate officers and directors to recover damages to
the corporation itself. There, the corporation remains a nominal defendant in the action, and if the
representation involves the same or a substantially related matter in which the lawyer had previously
represented the corporation, I am confident that the representation would be viewed as a violation of
Rule 1.9. Cf. Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 257–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that it was
improper for a former in-house counsel to a corporation to represent minority shareholder and
director in a proxy fight designed to gain control of the same corporation). On the other hand,
continued representation of the class itself, in opposition to the dissident class members, would not
violate Rule 1.9. See infra note 99.
99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The court also indicated that it thought traditional
rules would warrant disqualification of counsel who continues to represent the class, in opposition to
dissident class members challenging the settlement, because the lawyer, like former class counsel in
Agent Orange, “would be opposing the interests of some of his former clients in the very matter in
which he has represented them.” Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18. I disagree with this conclusion,
however, and therefore believe that the two situations are distinguishable. A lawyer for a class does
not represent individual class members; rather, she represents the class as a whole, i.e., as an entity.
See supra Part I. Accordingly, dissident class members are not former clients under Rule 1.9, just as
current class members are not clients under Rule 1.7. Continuing with the analogy to a shareholder’s
derivative action, it is commonly held that corporate counsel may be entitled to represent the
corporation in an action brought by a dissident shareholder. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. g (2000) (“[I]f . . . disinterested directors conclude that no
basis exists for the claim that the defending officers and directors have acted against the interests of
the organization, the lawyer may, with the effective consent of all clients, represent both the
organization and the officers and directors in defending the suit.”).
100. 748 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1984).
101. Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18.

MOORE.DOC

No. 5]

7/28/2003 10:27 AM

“WHO SHOULD REGULATE CLASS ACTION LAWYERS?”

119

discovery, the actual potential of the litigation.”102 Thus, the Agent
Orange court held:
A motion to disqualify an attorney who has represented the entire
class and who has thereafter been retained by a faction of the class
to represent its interest in opposition to a proposed settlement of
the action cannot be automatically granted. Rather, there must be
a balancing of the interests of the various groups of class members
and of the interest of the public and the court in achieving a just and
expeditious resolution of the dispute.103
Finding no allegations that actual prejudice would result if the lawyers
were not disqualified, the court denied the motion.104
A similar result was reached in Tedesco v. Mishkin,105 although
there the court did not expressly confront the implications of the ethics
rules. In Tedesco, investors involved in various enterprises organized
and controlled by the defendants filed a class action lawsuit alleging
fraud and racketeering in connection with the investments.106 After
certification of the class, defendants moved to remove certain named
plaintiffs and to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel.107 The court granted the
motion to remove one of the plaintiffs as a named representative on the
ground that he was for a time a co-trustee of one of the investment funds
and thus might be liable to the class if the class prevailed at trial.108 But
the court refused to disqualify the lawyer for the class, even though he
simultaneously represented the co-trustee on an individual basis.109 The
court acknowledged that there was a potential conflict of interest
between the class and the co-trustee, which is why he had been removed
as a class representative.110 As a remedy, however, the court did not
direct that his lawyer be removed as class counsel, but rather that class
counsel be directed to withdraw from representing the co-trustee in his
individual capacity.111 In refusing to disqualify class counsel, the court
relied both on the practical difficulties of “[s]ecuring new counsel for the
class at this point of the litigation” and the court’s ongoing role in
monitoring and protecting the interests of the class.112

102. Id. at 18–19; see also In re Corn Derivatives, 748 F.2d at 164 (Adams, J., concurring) (“[A]
rule requiring automatic disqualification may well penalize dissent, and thereby deprive the court of
the important assistance which objecting class members render by challenging the fairness of a class
action settlement.”).
103. Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 19; see also Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 588–90 (3d
Cir. 1999) (citing and quoting both Agent Orange and Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in Corn
Derivatives).
104. Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 19–20.
105. 689 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
106. Id. at 1330.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1336–37.
109. Id. at 1339–40.
110. Id. at 1340.
111. Id.
112. Id. According to the court:
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In each of these two cases, the court refused to disqualify class
counsel because of what it perceived as special considerations applying to
class action lawsuits. Both decisions can be defended; however, the fact
that they are justified does not necessarily mean that the ethical rules
should be modified to reflect their rulings. After all, even in civil
litigation outside of the class action context, the standards for
disqualification and discipline are not always the same.113 But the two
cases are distinguishable and, as such, illustrate the complex relationship
between ethics law and other law.
For example, it makes no sense to view the result in Agent Orange
as a product of differing ethical standards for disqualification and
disciplinary purposes. If the particular needs of class litigation are such
that class counsel must be free to switch from representing the class to
representing dissident class members opposing a settlement, as Agent
Orange suggests,114 then class counsel should not be subject to discipline
for doing so. In Tedesco, however, the lawyer, it can be argued, should
have been subject to disciplinary action for violating Model Rule 1.7
when he agreed to simultaneously represent both the co-trustee and the
class—that is, if he failed to adequately inform the co-trustee of the risks
involved in the simultaneous representation of the co-trustee and the
class of which he was a member.115 After all, the co-trustee was free to
retain separate counsel, and insisting that he be permitted to do so at the
outset would not have endangered the viability or the efficacy of the class
action device.116
Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in the prosecution of the securities and other fraud class
actions and have a record of successful results in such actions. The court has carefully monitored
plaintiffs’ attorneys through the course of this action. Plaintiffs’ counsel competently presented
evidence in a five day civil contempt hearing against Mishkin. In addition, they have periodically
submitted to the court comprehensive reports on the progress of discovery. The interests of the
class would be well served by continued representation by plaintiffs’ counsel.
Id.
113. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 71, 73 (1996)
[D]isqualification should not be a per se remedy for a violation of a conflict rule, . . . on the
contrary, the court’s determination should not be based on the conflicts rule at all. The conflict
rules, which are designed to apply to a lawyer’s decision at the outset of the representation, would
be overly restrictive if applied by courts in the disqualification setting after the representation is
under way.
Id. at 73.
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that having a conflict under Rule 1.7,
representation is impermissible unless the clients give informed consent and the conflict is determined
to be consentable).
116. It is unclear from the opinion whether the lawyer had already decided to pursue a class
action lawsuit at the time the co-trustee became a client. It does not matter, however. If the lawyer
already represented a putative class, then a conflict of interest arose under Rule 1.7, which required
the co-trustee to be fully informed prior to agreeing to be represented by class counsel. If the lawyer
had not yet decided to pursue a class action lawsuit, then he was obligated to consult with his cotrustee client regarding both the advantages and disadvantages of bringing the lawsuit as a class action
(thus implicating Rules 1.2 and 1.4) and the conflicts of interest inherent in taking on the class as an
additional client (thus implicating Rule 1.7). See supra text accompanying notes 105–112; see also infra
notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
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There is an important lesson here for class counsel with regard to
their relationships with individual class members. For example, it is
critically important to determine which, if any, of those class members
are or will be individual clients of the lawyer. In cases involving such
trivial amounts of money that it makes no sense to bring the action
except as a class action,117 the lawyer is unlikely to want to represent any
of the class members individually, including the named representatives.
Because these individuals may be confused about the lawyer’s role,
however, Model Rule 4.3 requires the lawyer to make reasonable efforts
to correct any misunderstanding.118 Such efforts should include a clear
statement that the lawyer will represent the class as a whole, not any
individual member, as well as an explanation of the role of both the
lawyer and the individual members at various stages of the proceedings.
In other situations—for example, mass torts and employment
discrimination—individuals often come to the lawyer with claims
sufficiently large to warrant traditional litigation.119 Here, the lawyer
might form an attorney-client relationship with one or more individuals
before any decision is made to pursue the claims in a class action lawsuit.
Putting aside the lawyer’s obligations to the putative class, the lawyer has
clear obligations to her existing clients. First, she must consider whether
pursuing the litigation as a class action is in the best interests of the
individual clients.120 If not, then the lawyer may not recommend such
action merely because it would benefit other individuals (or the lawyer
herself).121 The second obligation is to consult with the clients to
determine whether they agree to participate in a class action.122 The
consultation should include a full description of the extent to which the
clients will be relinquishing control of the litigation once the class
117. These cases are sometimes referred to as “small claim” class actions. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra
note 43, at 923–24.
118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002)
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not
state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding . . . .
119. Such cases are sometimes deemed inappropriate for class action treatment at all. See, e.g.,
Shapiro, supra note 43, at 926–27.
120. A client’s interests might include not only the recovery of monetary damages, but also the
correction of an injustice on a class-wide basis.
121. Cf. Koniak, supra note 2, at 1137–39 (discussing client who retained law firm to bring an
action for an asbestos-related illness who was asked to be a class representative, even though her
individual action could have been settled as one of many “present inventory” cases that were
apparently settled on a basis more favorable than the proposed class settlement).
122. See MODEL RULES R. 1.4(b) (2002) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).
The decision whether to bring an individual action or a class action should be viewed as an “objective”
of the representation, as to which agreement by the client, and not merely consultation, is required.
See id. R. 1.2(a) (2002) (“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation . . . .”); cf. Koniak, supra note 2, at 1139–41 (suggesting that a client who retained
lawyer to bring individual lawsuit agreed to be a class representative because she thought that was the
only way to get money from the defendants).
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complaint is filed.123 Finally, the lawyer must avoid the impermissible
representation of conflicting interests by informing existing clients of the
risks of the lawyer taking on the class as an additional client and
obtaining the clients’ informed consent to the conflict.124
IV. PROTECTING THE CLASS AGAINST CONFLICTS ARISING FROM THE
LAWYER’S DUTIES TO OTHERS (AND CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CLASS
ITSELF)
In Tedesco, the lawyer’s simultaneous representation of the class
itself and an individual class member who could have been sued as a
defendant created an obvious conflict of interest affecting the
representation of the individual member-client.125 In the previous part, I
argued that this conflict should have been resolved under a
straightforward application of Model Rule 1.7.126 In this part, I will
consider the application of Rule 1.7 to the same conflict as it affects the
representation of the class. The situation is analogous to one of several
conflicts in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,127 in which class counsel
represented a large “inventory” of “present claimants” with claims
similar to those of the putative “futures class” members but who were
not included in the class itself.128 When a negotiated settlement of the
futures class claims was presented for court approval (on the same day
the complaint was filed), a group of objectors argued the inadequacy of
class counsel on the ground that the simultaneous representation of
present and future claimants constituted an impermissible conflict of
interest.129 Two professors of legal ethics testified that such concurrent
representation constituted an impermissible conflict under Rule 1.7,130

123. See supra note 46 (discussing that class counsel can recommend a settlement over the
objection of the named representatives).
124. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 1.7).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 105–112.
126. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
127. 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom.
Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 519 U.S. 957 (1996), and aff’d, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
128. Id. at 294–96. As Susan Koniak has argued, the terminology used by the court may be
misleading, because there were members of the class who had already suffered harm and were
arguably indistinguishable from the inventory clients who received settlements outside the class itself.
See Koniak, supra note 2, at 1137–51 (arguing that named plaintiffs could have been included in
inventory settlements but were kept out in order to serve as class representatives); see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1190 & n.131 (like Koniak, adopting nomenclature of “present
clients” and “future claimants” to more accurately describe the facts in Georgine). Nevertheless, this
is the terminology used by the court and I believe it is sufficiently clear for my purposes.
129. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294–305.
130. Id. at 296–97 (discussing testimony of Professor Roger Cramton of Cornell Law School); id.
at 302–03 (discussing testimony of Professor Susan P. Koniak of Boston University School of Law).
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while two other professors testified that class counsel did not have an
impermissible conflict.131
Under a straightforward analysis of Rule 1.7, I agree that the dual
representation created at least a potentially impermissible conflict of
interest. From the outset, the risks to the class should have been clear.
First, the defendants were reluctant to negotiate with the present
claimants until there was at least some assurance that the futures claims
would be resolved,132 creating an incentive for class counsel to sacrifice
the interests of the class in order to settle the matter quickly. In addition,
the less money the lawyers demanded for the class, the more money
there would be available for the present claimants;133 given that class
counsel would almost certainly receive a greater percentage of the
amounts recovered under their individual fee agreements with the
present claimants than they would from the recovery for the class, they
had every reason to favor the present claimants over the futures class.134
Certainly, any lawyer who simultaneously represented just one present
claimant and one future claimant would have had a potentially
impermissible conflict under Rule 1.7.135
Of course, when lawyers represent individual claimants, potentially
impermissible conflicts are typically curable with the informed consent of
each client.136 Similarly, most entity clients can also consent to a conflict
through whatever decisional mechanism is available under the law
131. Id. at 297–99 (discussing testimony of Professor Geoffrey Hazard of Yale Law School, then
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professor John P. Freeman of the University of South
Carolina Scool of Law).
132. Id. at 294 (“In general . . . CCR determined to continue to make inventory settlements only if
it could obtain some kind of protection for the future.”).
133. The reverse is also true: the more money the lawyers demanded for the class, the less money
there would be available for the present claimants. This aspect of the conflict is one that should have
been fully disclosed to the present claimants, whom I have argued deserved the full benefit of a
rigorous application of Rule 1.7. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (raising this concern).
I am not arguing that the representation of multiple claimants against a single defendant always
presents a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(b). If the claims are dissimilar and there is no reason to
believe that the settlement value of one will affect the settlement value of another, then arguably there
is no conflict. Here, however, there is no question that the defendant viewed the inventory
settlements and future class settlement as significantly linked. See supra note 132 and accompanying
text.
134. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 661 & n.57 (2002) (comparing typical “benchmark” of
25% in class action fee awards, with the “standard ‘voluntary’ contingency fee of 33% to 40%”; citing
1996 study finding that median rates of recovery ranged in class actions ranged from 2.7% to 3.0%). It
is possible that even with a lower percentage award, the overall size of the legal fees likely to be
awarded under a settlement of the futures class would be higher than the total legal fees earned in the
settlement of the individuals’ claims. If so, then class counsel might have been tempted to sacrifice the
interests of some or all of the present claimants in favor of the futures class. This is a risk that should
be considered in determining the propriety of the representation of the present claimants under Rule
1.7. See supra note 133.
135. Again, I do not want to argue that representing multiple claimants against a single defendant
always presents a conflict of interests under Rule 1.7(b). See supra note 134. Here, however, where
every settlement was likely to become a precedent for future settlements, the defendants were
necessarily prone to viewing present and future claimants as presenting competing claims.
136. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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governing the particular entity.137 But class entities do not currently have
such a decisional mechanism,138 which is, presumably, why the two ethics
experts testified that the conflict was not merely potentially
impermissible, but was in fact impermissible.139
If Rule 1.7 is applied straightforwardly, then, I would agree that the
dual representation in Georgine was clearly unethical, given both the
existence of a conflict and the lack of informed consent on behalf of the
class. But this is not necessarily the best way of proceeding in cases like
Georgine, Tedesco, and all of the other class actions in which, as is fairly
common, class counsel represents individuals—both within140 and outside
of the class141—with interests that might conflict with the interests of the
class itself.
The particular conflicts in Georgine and Tedesco were severe and,
arguably, so compromised the interests of the class that some form of
remedy was desirable. But it is not necessarily desirable to create a per
se ethical prohibition on the simultaneous representation of both a class
and individuals with interests potentially at odds with those of the class.
Consider, for example, a class action brought by individuals with
substantial employment discrimination claims against a defendant: in all
likelihood, the case will begin with the representation of one or more
individual employees. A decision will then be made to bring the action
as a class action, perhaps in order to bring more pressure to bear upon
the defendant. There is no certainty that the putative class will actually
be certified, thus it makes no sense for the lawyer to abandon the
individual claimants in favor of representing the class alone.142 And even
if a separate lawyer could be found who is willing to represent the class
alone, it may be inefficient to have more than one lawyer or law firm
involved in the particular case. If the risks to the class are small in
relation to the potential benefits of pursuing the action with the same
lawyer representing both the class and some or all of the named

137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. e (2000)
(“Consent by an organization can be given in any manner consistent with the organization’s lawful
decisionmaking procedures.”).
138. See supra note 33.
139. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1190–93
(concluding, after examining the different expert opinions in Georgine, that there was a material
limitation conflict in Georgine and that the crux of the ethical problem is the difficulty of resolving the
consent issue in class actions).
140. See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1982); Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin.
Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Phila. Elec. Co., v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557
(E.D. Pa. 1969); see also NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, at 15–46 (stating that when class counsel
contacts class members to seek additional plaintiffs, it is not unlikely that such class members would
want to retain class counsel as their attorney).
141. See, e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987); Jackshaw Pontiac, Inc. v.
Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 102 F.R.D. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
142. Nor would it make sense to say that at the moment of class certification the lawyer ceases to
be counsel for the individuals and becomes counsel for the class alone, because class counsel owes
duties to the class even before it is certified. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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representatives, then, arguably, it is in the best interest of the class to
permit this type of multiple representation in at least some cases.
If so, the question then becomes how best to achieve this end
without thereby approving multiple representation in all cases. Staying
within the framework of Rule 1.7, we could look to the court to give
consent on behalf of the class.143 One problem with this solution is that
courts are not available to consent to prefiling conflicts;144 another
problem is that even at the time the class action complaint is filed, the
nature and extent of the conflict may not be known. An alternative
solution would be to do as was proposed to both the Kutak and Ethics
2000 Commissions and draft an entirely new ethics rule—one that
modifies the application of Rule 1.7 in the context of class actions.145
And, while modifying Rule 1.7 to protect the class against a lawyer’s
conflicts, we could simultaneously address the problem of the lawyer’s
obligations with regard to conflicts within the class—a problem not
currently addressed under conflict-of-interest doctrine because the class
itself is the client, not the individual members (or even groups of
members) within the class.146 Professor Richard Zitrin, for example,
proposed that the Commission adopt an ethics rule directly addressing
representation of a class, utilizing existing class action case law as a basis
for determining the content of such a rule.147
Here my concern is that ethics code drafters have neither the
expertise nor the authority148 to determine the appropriate relationships
between class action counsel and the various constituents of a class.
Moreover, given the courts’ current ability (and obligation) to monitor
the adequacy of representation as part of the class action lawsuit,149 I
143. See supra note 33 (discussing R. 1.8); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1193
(discussing the possibility that “the court can consider itself the ‘consenting’ party—in essence, ruling
from the basis of the fairness hearing that the parties either have constructively consented or would
consent to such a ‘fair’ deal and the work of class counsel”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.8 cmt. (2001).
144. Thus, the one commentator who has discussed this solution presumes that the court’s consent
would come at the time of the fairness hearing. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1193.
145. See supra notes 21, 62 and accompanying text. Neither the Waid nor the Zitrin proposal
suggested specifically how the conflicts of interest rule should be modified in the context of class
actions.
146. See supra Part I.
147. See supra note 62.
148. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1188 (“[T]hese cases also present difficult questions of
authority and power.”).
149. Rule 23(a)(4) provides that a class action can be maintained only if “the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Absent
adequacy of representation, the attempt to bind absent members of the class may violate due process.
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 42–43, 45 (1940)). In making this determination, courts typically seek to determine the ability of
the named representatives to adequately represent the class. See, e.g., Robin v. Doctors Officenters
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
The court’s primary concern in determining the adequacy of representation is whether the class
representative has a common interest with the class and has vigorously prosecuted its interests. A
representative cannot adequately protect the class if his interests are antagonistic to or in conflict
with the interests of those he represents.
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suggest that what makes the most sense is to leave these issues to be
resolved under class action law—namely, under the rubric of a further
elaboration of the adequacy of representation requirement of FRCP
Rule 23.150 In other words, when a lawyer has a conflict of interest that
might affect her representation of a class,151 class action law will trump
any application of Model Rule 1.7.152 In addition, the ethics rules will not
purport to define a lawyer’s obligations to the individual members (or
even groups of members), leaving these issues to be addressed by class
action law.153
This is not, however, the end of the story. It would be useful for
class action law to more clearly require courts to consider class counsel’s
conflicts as an important factor in determining the adequacy of
representation under Rule 23.154 Strictly speaking, the court would not
Id. at 203. In addition, however, courts consider the adequacy of class counsel, including an
examination of “the nature of the relationship between the named plaintiffs and counsel; counsel’s
experience in handling the type of litigation involved; counsel’s motivation; counsel’s support staff;
and counsel’s other professional commitments.” Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 117 F.R.D. 394, 401
(N.D. Ill. 1987). An attorney’s conflicts of interest have sometimes led to a finding that counsel was
inadequate, particularly when the attorney is a member of the class or is related to a member of the
class. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Kurczi v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 679 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (finding class counsel inadequate when class counsel
represented individual plaintiffs in parallel state court action). The relationship between the adequacy
of representation determination and rules of professional conduct is not clear. See, e.g., ROBERT H.
KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 152 n.8
(2000) (raising questions concerning the standards courts should apply in finding an attorney’s
conflicts renders the representation inadequate).
Courts also monitor the fairness of any proposed settlement, but determining adequacy of
representation and the fairness of a settlement are two entirely distinct inquiries. Cf. Lazy Oil Co. v.
Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s approval of class action settlement
and order refusing to remove or disqualify class counsel).
150. Currently, there is very little in the way of “class action law” that addresses the question of
the adequacy of representation by counsel burdened by a conflict of interest. See supra note 149.
Indeed, at present, courts will attempt to bypass the procedural requirement by first referring to and
then modifying the requirements under ethics law. See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.
151. I refer here to the type of conflicts traditionally considered under conflict-of-interest
doctrine, not the broader type of conflicts that would not typically call for any analysis under Rule 1.7.
See supra Part II.
152. My thanks to Susan Koniak for making this point. If there were a body of class action law
that clearly addressed the adequacy of representation of class counsel burdened by a conflict of
interests, then I would suggest adding a comment to Rule 1.7, stating that the ethical propriety of class
representation under such circumstances must be determined by reference to such other law. In that
case, we would no longer need to view such law as “trumping” Rule 1.7.
153. There is an analogy here to the Ethics 2000 Commission’s decision rejecting another of
Richard Zitrin’s proposals—to adopt an ethics rule prohibiting lawyers from participating in secret
settlements when there is a danger to the public. See Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in
the Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923 (2002). There the Commission’s reasoning was
that lawyers should not be prohibited from advising their clients regarding conduct that is lawful for
the client. In other words, ethics rules should not attempt to regulate secret settlements by enacting
rules applicable only to lawyers. Similarly, the rights of named representatives and class members
should be resolved as a matter of class action law, not ethics law.
154. In ruling on motions to disqualify class counsel on grounds of a conflict affecting the interests
of the class, the court should use the same standards as would be applied if the court were ruling on
the adequacy of class counsel at a certification hearing, with the caveat that denial of the motion to
disqualify does not represent a final determination of the adequacy of class counsel, given that the
facts regarding the severity of the conflict may have developed substantially in the intervening period.

MOORE.DOC

No. 5]

7/28/2003 10:27 AM

“WHO SHOULD REGULATE CLASS ACTION LAWYERS?”

127

be applying Rule 1.7 at all. Nevertheless, many of the principles and
concepts underlying that rule could be taken into account in the Rule 23
analysis. Thus, in Georgine, the simultaneous representation of “present
claimants” and a class of “future claimants” should have led the trial
court to scrutinize the adequacy of representation far more carefully than
it would have in the absence of such a conflict,155 particularly in light of
persuasive evidence of the significantly different treatment these two
groups received under their respective settlements.156 Similarly, in
determining whether the creation of subclasses (with separate
representation) was necessary to meet the adequacy of representation
requirement under Rule 23, the trial court should have considered the
extent of divergence of the interests of various groups within the class, as
was subsequently held by the Supreme Court of the United States in that
case.157 Both these determinations can be helpfully informed by the
underlying principles and concepts of Rule 1.7: for example, recognizing
the extent to which conflicts tempt a lawyer to favor one group over
another or to ignore important differences between individuals or groups
in order to achieve a resolution of either or both sets of claims, and
understanding the concept that some conflicts pose risks so severe that
they are deemed nonconsentable.158
CONCLUSION
Providing greater guidance to lawyers was one of the paramount
goals of the Ethics 2000 Commission.159 Given the current confusion
surrounding the ethics of class action lawyers,160 the Commission was
certainly inclined to provide additional guidance in these cases, if at all
possible. Nevertheless, it reluctantly concluded that there was little that
could be done through the vehicle of an ethics code.161 After all, it is not
for ethics regulators to determine who is the client of a class action
lawyer or what specific duties are owed by the lawyer to those persons
(such as class representatives or absent class members) who are certainly
not clients in any traditional sense.162 In the Commission’s view, these
155. Cf., e.g., In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’ships Litig., 171 F.R.D. 104, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(referring to a “‘higher’ or ‘closer’ level of scrutiny that applies to judicial review of settlements
involving settlement classes”).
156. The mere fact that the two groups were treated differently does not mean that the settlement
was unfair. Adequate representation is determined separate and apart from the overall fairness of the
settlement. See supra note 147.
157. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). For a critique of the Amchem
opinion, see Silver & Baker, supra note 28, at 1491 (arguing that interclient tradeoffs are inevitable).
158. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
159. Cf. Moore, supra note 153, at 930 (“Mindful of the educational role of the Rules, the
Commission proposed a number of changes designed primarily to give greater guidance for lawyers,
thus enhancing the likelihood of compliance with the Rules as professional norms.”).
160. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
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are matters for determination and elaboration by rules of civil procedure
and courts that interpret and apply such rules.163
The scope of the problem, however, may not be nearly as large as is
often supposed. If, for example, courts would clarify that the client of a
class action lawyer is the class itself—an entity client—then it would be
readily apparent that traditional conflict rules, like Model Rule 1.7,
simply do not apply to the different, and potentially conflicting, interests
of individual class members; therefore, these rules need not be modified
in order to accommodate the class action device.164 Similarly, lawyers
should recognize that some conflicts of interest—such as conflicts over
the size of the lawyer’s fee—are endemic to law practice and were never
meant to be addressed under conflict-of-interest rules. Of course, courts
supervising class actions are free to adopt procedures to ensure that class
counsel’s fees are reasonable, but they need not worry that they are bypassing the conflict-of-interest rules. As for those conflicts that are
subject to Rule 1.7—such as the simultaneous representation of a class
and persons inside or outside the class—this article has argued that
individual clients are entitled to full protection of the conflict rules, so
that they can determine for themselves whether they would be better
served by retaining independent counsel.165
The problem that remains is not insubstantial, however. From the
perspective of the class itself, there may be good reason to avoid “strict”
application of the conflict rules in some cases, but not necessarily in all
cases. In my view, elaborating the circumstances under which these
conflicts should be tolerated is best done not by ethics code drafters, but
rather by courts interpreting and applying the adequacy of
representation requirement of FRCP Rule 23. In doing so, courts should
consider the underlying principles and concepts of the ethics rules. They
should do so, however, not as a matter of bending the ethics rules, but
rather of elaborating the necessary details of class action law—a law
upon which ethics codes can then draw in giving further advice to class
action lawyers.

163. See supra notes 21–22.
164. As previously noted, it is not necessary to adopt the entity client view to conclude that Rule
1.7 does not apply to conflict of interest within the class, but there are important advantages to doing
so. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part III.

